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This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on the 
conflict increasingly referred to as the ‘Southern Africa Thirty-Year War’. That 
armed conflict extended from the Mpondo Rebellion, which started in 1960 and the 
uprisings in northern Angola in 1961, to the final whimpers of township unrest in 
South Africa in the early 1990s. It included the protracted insurgencies of the 
former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the brutal Rhodesian 
‘Bush War’ for Zimbabwean liberation, the foreign involvement in the Angolan 
civil war, the fight for the independence of Namibia and the ‘Struggle’ in South 
Africa. 
Historians increasingly see it as one long war, simply because the 
protagonists, while not waging it as an integrated and formally coordinated 
conflict, had two clear aims: the maintenance of white hegemony on the one side, 
and national liberation on the other, and they had a loose alliance on each side. The 
various campaigns of this war followed a common thread on both sides, and the 
battles were waged and operations conducted within the same approximate period 
of thirty years. It was, in fact, a sub-continent embroiled in a mostly low-intensity 
war for three long decades. 
The literature that has emerged in 
recent years has been varied, and some 
campaigns and clashes in this complex 
conflict have received more attention than 
others. Much of what has been written has 
been in the form of memoirs or recollections 
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by participants, with relatively little appearing that is based on careful historical 
research. The strife in Angola between the time of that country’s controversial and 
contested birth as an independent state in 1975 and the withdrawal of Cuban and 
South African surrogate forces in 1989 has, for the most part, been recorded and 
published by South African participants, or authors depicting events from the 
South African perspective. This alone, makes A far-away war an extremely 
valuable English-language contribution (despite the cover incorrectly claiming that 
it depicts both sides of the story). 
Contemporary history (that within living memory) will always evoke 
emotions and result in controversy. This is perhaps even more so in the case of 
contemporary military history, where emotions have frequently been sharpened by 
battle and by the supreme sacrifice of comrades who have earned that epithet in the 
crucible of combat. The credentials of the author (in this case, the editors and 
contributors) are therefore of vital importance in a book such as this. The three 
principal editors are firstly a South African academic who is openly critical of the 
military approach of the former South African regime; secondly, a Cuban 
government official and former member of the Cuban Communist Party Central 
Committee; and thirdly, a Russian academic and former Soviet official of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As is therefore to be expected, the book 
portrays one side of the conflict in a favourable light, and casts anything but 
complimentary views on the other.  
Although this probably helps the discerning reader to add some balance to 
the many publications on the war that have reflected the opposing viewpoint, this 
book does not, in itself, claim to provide an objective perspective. In fact, the 
editors make it clear in the introduction that they “cannot claim ownership of the 
truth about the war in Angola”, and that their intention is merely to “allow different 
voices to speak and other voices to be heard about an era of war in southern 
Africa” (p11). 
The book is a compendium of interpretations of the war, commencing with 
a useful, if somewhat disjointed, background to the conflict in and over Namibia. 
This, however, does not provide much detail of the lengthy UN/South African 
wrangling over South West Africa/Namibia, and it gives nothing of substance on 
military strategy. It then goes on to place the war in Angola into perspective, using 
the Cold War as a template. After discussing the militarisation of white society in 
South Africa over the period 1972–1988, there are some enlightening contributions 
on the involvement in Angola of the Cubans, the Soviets and the East Germans. 
The book concludes with a rather lengthy diatribe on conscription and an attempt 
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to raise the historical profile of the resistance to compulsory military service that 
existed among some white South Africans. 
For those whose previous reading on the war in question may have been 
restricted to the so-called ‘SADF [South African Defence Force] version’, much of 
what is dealt with in this publication will come as a surprise – even a revelation. 
Other information could well simply confirm long-held beliefs or suspicions about 
the war. In both cases, this is possibly the greatest contribution of the book. 
However, in a sense, the book is a missed opportunity. The absence of any 
Namibian or Angolan contributions could be seen as a glaring shortcoming in a 
book about war in Angola, which was waged largely over the future of Namibia. 
Perhaps less attention could have been given to the questions of militarisation of 
white South African society and conscientious objection to conscription, as these 
are both enormous subjects about which little has seen the light in recent years. 
They certainly both warrant intensive further research and publications in their own 
right, the works of Cock and Nathan, as well as Conway, notwithstanding. 
However, they are decidedly peripheral to the Angolan conflict. A far-away war 
might rather have included viewpoints of the FAPLA1 and PLAN2 participation in 
the war in order to give a more rounded reflection of “the other side” (as the book’s 
cover terms it).  
The book has an exceptionally comprehensive and valuable bibliography, 
listing what is probably the most complete collection of works on or related to the 
Thirty-Year War that has ever been compiled. However, although the titles include 
works in English, Afrikaans, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian, readers should not 
expect coverage of campaigns not involving South African military adventurism in 
Angola to be covered. As can be expected, there is very little of the literature listed 
that deals with the campaigns in Rhodesia and Mozambique.  
The considerable number of photographs taken from Cuban archives and 
from Russian sources is a particularly impressive feature of the book. Most 
publications of this conflict tend to use and re-use familiar photos, mostly taken 
from the South African side. It is therefore indeed refreshing to see pictures that 
throw fresh light on certain aspects of the war because they were taken from the 
other side. Sadly, it would appear that the Cuban archives were not as forthcoming 
in providing written documentary sources for use by contributors.  
Another useful table is the chronology, “Namibia: From Colony to 
Independent State”. It might have been worthwhile to include some admittedly 
generally known events (such as the start and the end of the World Wars, and the 
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invasion of German South West Africa by South Africa in 1914), if only to 
contextualise the other events that are listed. 
On the matter of contextualisation, the summary by Professor Phil 
Eidelberg of the Angolan War as a Cold War template is excellent. It is certainly 
the most balanced and succinct conspectus I have read of the circumstances that led 
to and sustained Soviet involvement in Angola. It succeeds in making sense of 
much that otherwise seems confusing. 
Both López and the two Shubins provide some valuable, previously little-
known information of great interest. Hedelberto López gives an excellent sketch of 
the run-up to the intense fighting in Angola during 1975/1976 from the Cuban 
point of view, while Vladimir and Gennady Shubin give a good exposition of how 
the Soviets came to be involved. Albeit based mainly on secondary sources and 
interviews, their use of the notebooks of the Soviet military advisor in Angola over 
a period of three years reveals some compelling and incontrovertible aspects of the 
conflict, recorded at the time by a very senior Soviet general officer. The Shubins, 
however, seem to have misread the aims of the SADF in Angola, completely 
missing the intention to counter SWAPO’s insurgency. They thus tend to portray 
the many SADF incursions as far bigger than they actually were.  
Nevertheless, they openly provide intriguing insights into tensions and 
disagreements between the Cubans, Angolans and Soviets during operations. 
FAPLA setbacks, poor decisions and failures are also referred to, all of which add 
to the credibility of their account. Their contribution contains possibly the most 
profound statement in the entire book, “Peace was to arrive only years later in 
Angola following the death of Jonas Savimbi whose ineffectual movement, 
UNITA, had been built up through foreign intervention since 1975 to become a 
major destabilising factor in Angola.” (p97) Of course, the irony is that precisely 
the same could be said about how the initially ineffective MPLA had been 
sustained through the years of war by foreign intervention. 
López, in his Cuban contribution, is carefully selective about casualty 
figures, and he scrupulously avoids any reference to the charismatic General 
Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, who was the commander of Cuban forces in Angola but 
was subsequently executed by the Castro regime for controversial treason charges 
coupled to drug running. Some have claimed that his demise was due to Cuban 
military failure in Angola. However, it would probably be a bit much to expect 
revelations on this dark matter from a journalist and historian from Havana who 
was once a permanent correspondent of Juventud Rebelde, the official Cuban 
Communist Party youth journal. 
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Liebenberg contributes a fascinating chapter on Russian–South African 
relations over more than a century, although it is coloured by his apparent 
obsession with dismissing the Cold War as Western fiction. He concludes with the 
quaint, but somewhat tenuous claim that there is a link between the support of the 
Boers by Tsarist Russia during the Anglo-Boer War, and the support of the 
liberation movements by Communist USSR during their struggle. This he bases 
rather nebulously and unconvincingly on “historical ties and emotional bonds” 
(p79). 
The chapter on the involvement of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) (East Germany) is the only one to make use of official archival documents. 
Doubtless, this is because that country has been reunited with the non-Communist 
Federal Republic of Germany (then known as West Germany), so there is no 
longer the restriction on access to such archives that would apply in a Communist 
country. This makes it possibly the most convincing contribution in the 
compilation that forms this book. The authors, Dr (Major) Klaus Storkmann and 
Prof. Ulrich van der Heyden, have made a careful study of official documentation 
with minimal use of secondary sources. Their engrossing outline of the initial 
reluctance of the GDR to provide support to the MPLA due to its own financial 
constraints, and of Erich Honecker’s personal commitment and support where 
possible make absorbing reading that prompts further consultation of other works. 
The authors effectively dispel the horror stories of large-scale involvement in 
Angola by East German paratroopers. 
The greatest shortcoming for a book of this nature is undoubtedly the 
poorly reproduced maps of the area under discussion (specifically, Angola). These 
maps have unfortunately been compiled from the point of view of SADF 
involvement, which is certainly not the focus of the book. They show very few of 
the places referred to by the Cuban and other writers. Importantly, they also do not 
name the rivers, which were a crucial aspect of operations during the war. The 
maps are therefore of little use to the reader. 
Another unfortunate shortcoming that could be levelled at the book is the 
tendency by some of the contributors to view the ebb and flow of war as purely 
military, with little regard for political imperatives. While it makes for good copy 
and political correctness to portray some actions by the SADF as military defeats, 
there is no effort made to examine the international and diplomatic pressures that 
left soldiers with no choice but to obey their political masters, regardless of how 
successful they may or may not have been on the battlefield at that point. 
Perhaps this tendency in the book is driven by the fact that there is a dearth 
of professional military men among the contributors. While some had served as 
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conscripts, one of the editors spent eight years in the Soviet military and another 
was apparently a major, possibly in the East German Armed Forces, none had 
served in the higher echelons of command. This is somewhat surprising for a 
compendium on a modern war. This absence of professional military inputs raises 
the question of the classification of histories of conflicts. 
Although there are contesting opinions on this classification of the type of 
history portrayed in literature about armed conflict, I personally subscribe to the 
view that ‘War History’ deals with all aspects of a war, such as political, social, 
economic, cultural, technological development and biographical works on 
prominent political decision-makers in those fields, with the purely military aspects 
forming only a constituent part of the overall picture. ‘Military History’ on the 
other hand, is a far narrower field and consists exclusively of the battles, 
skirmishes, tactics, techniques, technology application, strategy and military 
personalities forming part of that war. I get the impression that this book was an 
attempt to write military history, but that in fact, it is far broader, and actually 
covers war history. 
In military history, correct military terminology and understanding is 
important. Incorrect or faulty terminology detracts from the credibility and value of 
any book on military history. A military historian, if not a military person should 
become acquainted with common military jargon, official terminology and basic 
organisation. This book contains numerous errors that will jar a military reader. For 
example, the “airborne soldiers” referred to on page 28 were also conscripts, 
though they were conscripts who had volunteered for parachute training. The first 
skirmish with SWAPO in 1966, although officially a police action, involved as 
many SADF members as police officers. Multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) are 
also regarded as artillery, and the SADF version was developed as a result of 
clashes with Cuban, not Angolan MRLs; and the ‘arms race’ in southern Africa 
had, on the SADF side, less to do with the quantity of arms, than with their quality, 
as population limitations alone restricted the numbers that could be deployed. On a 
technical point which is frequently missed by writers (including one in this book), 
the Casspir mine-resistant vehicle was never spelled ‘Caspir’ – its name was a 
jumbled acronym formed from the abbreviation CSIR (for the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research) who had designed and developed the vehicle, 
and SAP (South African Police) who had been responsible for its specifications. 
Liebenberg, as the principal contributor, is at pains to emphasise what he 
terms Cold War’ mythology, even “paranoia” (p69) This is a difficult angle with 
which to come to grips, particularly as the Cold War is accepted by most of the 
other contributors as a hard fact, and there are few serious historians who would 
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deny its reality during the post-war era of the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. The 
fact is that liberation movements, no less than any other political entity of the time, 
manipulated circumstances in the bipolar world of the Cold War to get what 
support they could from whatever source was available. In fact, the frequently 
derisive comments in the book about the ‘constructive engagement’ policy of the 
United States of America towards apartheid South Africa, merely serve to confirm 
the reality of the Cold War.  
It is mendacious for Shubin to claim, “what was described by the West as a 
Cold War, (was described) by the Soviet Union as support for national liberation 
movements in an anti-colonial struggle” (p83). This blatantly ignores the situation 
in Europe, where the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact faced each other in a state of alert, and it makes light of the 
nuclear stand-off between the super-powers. While the Soviets certainly wanted to 
help socialist forces come to power all over the world, it would be naïve to believe 
that in an international arena of super-power politics and an international bipolar 
struggle, this was done for purely altruistic reasons. The war in Angola may have 
been peripheral to the central struggle, but it was certainly part of that power play. 
The production and acquisition of armament is always a murky minefield 
for a writer to enter, and needs to be done with great circumspection. This is not 
only because it is an emotional issue, but because the deals that are involved are 
frequently devious and the trails are thus carefully covered up. Conclusive facts are 
therefore often difficult to ascertain, and sources seldom agree in detail. However, 
those matters that are indisputable should be diligently established by anyone 
including such matters in a history. For instance, A far-away war makes no 
reference to the short-lived Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) as the 
source of South Africa’s first major, modern, post-Second World War armament 
acquisition.  
In the wake of the Second World War and the advent of the confrontation that 
become known as the Cold War, a series of defence treaties were signed in the 
West. These included NATO, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), 
ANZUS (the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), and MEDO. 
South Africa was a signatory to MEDO, signed in London in 1951, in terms of 
which a South African armoured division and nine South African Air Force 
squadrons would be provided to help counter any Soviet offensive through the 
Middle East aimed at Africa. This was pure Cold War strategy, and although the 
agreement was abandoned in 1957 in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, it did 
result in South Africa being supplied with 201 Centurion tanks, as well as Saracen 
armoured personnel carriers and Ferret scout cars (these were not provided in the 
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1960s, as Liebenberg avers). Similarly, South Africa’s involvement in the Korean 
War led to the acquisition of aircraft (the Canadair Sabre Mk 6 was one of these, 
acquired from Canada – something the Canadians today studiously avoid 
mentioning). The Simon’s Town Agreement of 1955 resulted in the Union 
acquiring six frigates, ten minesweepers and four other coastal defence vessels 
from Britain. All this was a direct result of the Cold War. 
This context is missing from the book, perhaps because of the element of 
denialism about the Cold War, which is propagated in some contributions. But it is 
disingenuous to judge the 1950s through a 21st-century lens. Memories of the 
Second World War were fresh in people’s minds, and in the West, the Soviet 
repression in Hungary and other Eastern European countries was interpreted as a 
stark confirmation of Soviet expansionist intentions. Western political and military 
leaders saw the conflicts and confrontations in Korea, Indo-China, Malaya, Borneo 
and later Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Vietnam as a very real part of the Cold War. It 
is easy to dismiss this as a ‘myth’, a ‘syndrome’ or ‘myopia’ in the light of the 
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but in doing so, one 
forgets that this collapse took the West, no less than the Soviets themselves, by 
surprise. 
It is also incorrect to ascribe the development of the highly successful Ratel 
infantry combat vehicle to lessons learnt during the SADF incursion into Angola in 
1975 and confrontations with Cuban armoured forces. The design and development 
of the Ratel commenced in the early 1970s, well before any encounter with Cuban 
armament. The development of South African artillery, however, was certainly 
inspired by the Angolan adventure and the artillery duels that were fought then. 
Furthermore, the implication that Namibian independence struggles have 
always been national is highly questionable. The indigenous people at the time of 
the German colonisation had no concept of a country that was fabricated during 
conferences held in Europe by the colonial powers. Their desire was simply to be 
rid of the yoke of foreign domination. It fell to SWAPO, in the 1960s and 1970s, to 
unite the various tribal and other groupings in a national struggle. Not to 
acknowledge this is to detract from what is arguably one of SWAPO’s greatest 
achievements as a movement. 
Some of the contributions are, in places, a little disjointed, with the writing 
lacking flow making it difficult to follow – possibly due to the author not 
expressing himself in his home language. There is also a tendency to accept 
Russian and Cuban viewpoints as fact, while being almost arrogantly dismissive of 
SADF claims. Perhaps reminiscent of ‘the victor in a war writes the history’. 
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Regarding resistance to conscription, which constitutes the longest chapter 
in the book, the point appears to be missed that most citizens in any society object 
to being conscripted. This has nothing to do with conscience, but everything to do 
with the inconvenience of being deprived of one’s comfort zone and a dislike of 
having one’s freedom curtailed by being subjected to military discipline. In most of 
the works on conscientious objection in South Africa, this truth is generally glossed 
over in the efforts to reflect resistance to apartheid aggression. This bestows on the 
average white conscript an unearned ‘badge of honour’. There does, however, 
appear to have been an increased reluctance to serve when soldiers were deployed 
in the townships. 
This chapter deserves a review on its own, but as has been stated, the 
subject warrants a book on its own. Suffice to say, there appears to have been 
almost no archival research done on resistance to conscription. Almost everything 
in the chapter is based on secondary sources, making the figures somewhat suspect. 
There must surely be accurate figures on numbers called up, numbers who 
reported, numbers of conscientious objectors, courts martial, sentences imposed, 
desertions and so on in the official archives. It is a fallow field, waiting to be 
ploughed, but will require a stern and dogged ploughman.  
It is always difficult to decide what to include in an index, and this book 
has a good and very useful one. However, it was disappointing that it did not 
include the various armament types referred to so frequently in the text. In the 
same vein, it would have been useful to indicate, during references to UN 
Resolutions, whether these were resolutions of the General Assembly or of the 
Security Council. Only those of the latter were considered binding. 
In conclusion, I would recommend this book to anyone who seriously 
desires to have a better understanding of the Southern African Thirty-Year War, 
and specifically the campaign in Angola after the Portuguese departure. It gives 
viewpoints that have been conveniently ignored by many writers, and though many 
participants in the war, and even scholars of the war, may take issue with some of 
what the book contains, it certainly provides some much-needed balance. Broad 
perspective and proper contextualisation are often the vital factors missing in most 
military and even war history that covers contemporary periods. This book will 
help to provide that for those whose reading on the war might have perforce been 
one-sided. 
Whereas many who have written at length and often with great passion of 
battles and campaigns in Southern Africa, have tried hard to portray a military 
victory by one side or the other, the truth, as is often the case, is difficult to pin 
down. World events have a profound effect on local conflicts, just as local conflicts 
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contribute towards world events. In the words of Professor Phil Eidelberg, one of 
the contributors in this book: 
In Angola, as in the Horn of Africa, the USSR and its Cuban allies would 
end up in a series of inconclusive land battles during the late 1970s and 
1980s which would sap the economic strength of the Soviet Bloc. In turn, 
these land battles also drained the resources of an increasingly isolated 
government in South Africa. 
What this important book does above all else is to make serious readers of 
military history aware of the need for a concise volume on the entire Southern 
African Thirty-Year War, encompassing all the campaigns and major clashes, 
reflected from both sides and providing a contextual international background. A 
major undertaking indeed! 
 
                                                        
1 Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (the Popular Armed Forces 
for the Liberation of Angola), the armed forces of the MPLA (Movimento Popular 
de Libertação de Angola), the Marxist movement that seized power in Angola in 
1975 and continues to govern the country today.  
2 People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of SWAPO (South West 
African People’s Organisation), the organisation that opposed South African 
occupation of Namibia and that was voted into power in the country’s first elections. 
It has continued to win every election, and remains the governing party in the 
country. 
